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Trade-Offs in Fairness and Preference Judgments
Abstract
At the heart of many debates about distributive justice is the widely assumed trade-off between equality and
efficiency (Okun, 1975). In the present chapter, equality refers to the distribution of income within a society.
Equality increases whenever income variability is reduced. Efficiency refers to the goods and services that
result from a given input – production, physical capital, or human labor. Efficiency increases whenever society
produces more from the same input. Trade-offs between equality and efficiency occur because increases in
one often lead to decreases in the other. An egalitarian society satisfies basic needs by establishing programs
that redistribute wealth. But those programs can reduce efficiency when they introduce bureaucratic waste or
diminish financial incentives. A reduction in efficiency can lead to fewer investments, fewer jobs, and declining
productivity.
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Trade-offs in fairness and
preference judgments
Lisa D. Ordonez and Barbara A. Mellers
At the heart of many debates about distributive justice is the widely as-
sumed trade-off between equality and efficiency (Okun, 1975). In the pre-
sent chapter, equality refers to the distribution of income within a society.
Equality increases whenever income variability is reduced. Efficiency refers
to the goods and services that result from a given input - production,
physical capital, or human labor. Efficiency increases whenever society
produces more from the same input. Trade-offs between equality and effi-
ciency occur because increases in one often lead to decreases in the other.
An egalitarian society satisfies basic needs by establishing programs that
redistribute wealth. But those programs can reduce efficiency when they
introduce bureaucratic waste or diminish financial incentives. A reduction
in efficiency can lead to fewer investments, fewer jobs, and declining pro-
ductivity.
Theories of distributive justice
Is there an ideal point along the equality-efficiency continuum? Political
and moral philosophers have articulated a number of positions about what
constitutes justice and how to arrive at just distributions of resources and
rewards. These positions place differential emphasis on equality and effi-
ciency.
Utilitarians believe that society should be arranged to maximize the total
(or sometimes average) utility of all individuals (Bentham, 1961/1789). If
utility is identical to profit, then profit maximization occurs when efficiency
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is greatest. This version of utilitarianism might emphasize efficiency over
equality. On the other hand, if utility is a negatively accelerated function
of income, the poor benefit more from any given dollar. This form of utili-
tarianism might strike a compromise between equality and efficiency in an
attempt to provide both assistance at the bottom and incentives at the top.
Egalitarians argue that society should be arranged to provide food, shel-
ter, and essential medical care for all concerned. These basic needs are
satisfied by means of redistributive policies that minimize income inequal-
ity. In this framework, the emphasis is on equality rather than efficiency.
More recently, Rawls (1971) developed a philosophical theory of justice
based on a social contract. Rawls asks what would happen if the framers
of society operated behind a "veil of ignorance," so that they knew nothing
about their future socioeconomic position. Rawls contends that two prin-
ciples of justice would emerge. The first is the principle of greatest equal
liberty; each person would have an equal right to the most extensive sys-
tem of liberties and freedoms. The second is the difference principle, which
asserts that societal and economic institutions should be arranged to ben-
efit the worst off. This principle is a maximin rule. Disparities in wealth are
assumed to be just when they improve the welfare of the poorest members
of society. This theory focuses on the incomes of the least advantaged
members of society.
Compromises between equality and efficiency
Researchers have posited that, for an assortment of cognitive and political
reasons, people have difficulty making trade-offs between strongly held
values such as environmental protection and economic growth (Abelson &
Levi, 1985; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Tetlock, 1986). Hadari (1988) notes
that some philosophical theories of distributive justice structure society to
avoid trade-offs between basic values. Utilitarians escape trade-offs by re-
ducing all values to a single scale of utility or welfare. Rawls avoids trade-
offs by lexicographically ordering values. Only after a society has estab-
lished basic liberties for everyone does the maximin rule apply.
The present chapter investigates how people make trade-offs when
judging societal fairness and preference. It builds on earlier work by Mitch-
ell, Tetlock, Mellers, and Ordonez (1992) that examined the judged fairness
of hypothetical societies. In those experiments, societies were displayed as
income distributions, that is, average incomes in each quartile. Equality
and efficiency were manipulated using income variance and average in-
come, respectively. Societies with more income variance had greater in-
come inequality. Societies with higher average income had greater effi-
ciency. Subjects were told to assume that the distribution of inputs was
held constant across all societies, so greater profits resulted from greater
efficiency.
A fairness ranking over societies was derived for each individual. When
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the effort-reward correlation was low, rankings correlated higher with in-
come variance (equality). When the effort-reward correlation was high,
rankings were better predicted from average income (efficiency). Mitchell
et al. (1992) concluded that the effort-reward correlation or level of meri-
tocracy was a moderator of equality-efficiency trade-offs.
In Mitchell et al. (1992), income variance was confounded with mini-
mum income (i.e., average income in the lowest quartile). We manipulate
both factors and investigate whether the predictability of income variance
is due to a concern for the overall income variability or the floor of the
income distribution. Furthermore, we manipulate the effort-reward cor-
relation in such a way that subjects can make trade-offs between this factor
and others. We also investigate judged preferences to examine whether
people prefer to live in societies they judge more fair. Finally, do trade-offs
made at the societal level also occur at the individual level? We ask subjects
to judge the extent to which an individual within different societies is ov-
erbenefited or underbenefited. Of interest is whether the same factors in-
fluence fairness judgments at the micro and macro levels (Brickman, Fol-
ger, Goode, & Schul, 1981).
Macro fairness and preference
Two experiments examined judgments of societal fairness and preference.
Societies were displayed as scatterplots with salary plotted against work
index. Work index, ranging from 0 (lowest contribution) to 4 (highest con-
tribution), was said to reflect merit, seniority, effort, productivity, experi-
ence, etc. The distribution of work was held constant across societies.
In Experiment 1, eight societies were constructed from variations along
three factors: minimum salary, mean salary, and salary standard devia-
tion.1 Figure 1 presents two societies that differ in salary mean and salary
standard deviation. Society A has a lower mean salary, but less salary vari-
ability; Society B has a higher mean salary, but more salary variability.
In Experiment 2, sixteen societies were formed by manipulating the three
factors in Experiment 1 and the effort-reward correlation. Figure 2 shows
two societies that differ in correlation and minimum salary. Society A has
a higher minimum salary but a lower work-salary correlation, and Society
B has a higher correlation but a lower minimum salary.
Table 1 gives information about the eight societies in Experiment 1.
The correlation between work and salary ranged from .19 to .77 across
societies. Table 2 provides information about the sixteen societies in
Experiment 2. In both experiments, the distribution of work was held
constant.
Subjects were presented with all possible pairs of societies. In the fair-
ness conditions, subjects judged which society was more fair. In the pref-
erence conditions, subjects selected the society in which they preferred to
live. Subjects were told that the poverty level was $15,000.2 After comple-









Society A Society B
0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 0.0 1.0
WORK INDEX
2.0 3.0 4.0
Figure 1 Trade-offs between measures of equality and efficiency in Experiment 1.
Society A has a narrow salary standard deviation and a low mean salary. Society B




















 # Society B #
•
• •
0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 0.0 1.0 2.0
WORK INDEX
3.0 4.0
Figure 2 Correlation and minimum salary trade-offs in Experiment 2. Society A
has a high minimum salary but a low correlation, and Society B has a high correla-
tion but a low minimum salary.
tion of the two tasks, subjects answered a questionnaire requesting infor-
mation about sex, socioeconomic status, political party affiliation, and po-
litical views (rating on a seven-point conservative/liberal scale). In Experi-
ment 2, subjects were also asked to state their anticipated socioeconomic
status and rank the importance of each experimental factor in their fairness
and preference judgments. Participants were undergraduates at the Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley who received credit in a lower division
psychology course. There were 80 and 70 subjects in Experiments 1 and 2,
respectively.
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Note: The first letter in the society label refers to the mini-
mum salary (L = low and H = high). The second represents
mean salary (L = low and H = high). The third letter refers
to the salary standard deviation (W = wide and N = narrow).






























































































Note: The first letter in the society label refers to the correlation between work
index and salary (L = low and H = high). The second represents minimum salary
(L = low and H = high). The third letter refers to the mean salary (L = low and
H = high). The fourth represents standard deviation (W = wide and N = narrow).
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Did subjects make trade-offs?
For each subject, two societal rankings were derived - one for fairness and
one for preference. These rankings were computed by counting the num-
ber of times a society was judged as more fair (or more preferred) than the
others. Scores could range from 0 to 7 in Experiment 1 and from 0 to 15 in
Experiment 2. The higher the score, the higher the rank of that society. If
two or more societies received the same score, ranks were tied.
Trade-offs were assumed to occur if societal rankings were inconsistent
with a lexicographic order of any of the experimental measures. For ex-
ample, a lexicographic order of minimum salary would be one in which all
societies with high minimum salaries were ranked above those with low
minimum salaries. Societies with the same minimum salary might be dis-
tinguished on the basis of other factors, but this ordering would be second-
ary to considerations of minimum salary.
In Experiment 1, 57% and 52% of the subjects had fairness and prefer-
ence rankings that were inconsistent with any of the lexicographic orders.
In Experiment 2, 38% and 70% had fairness and preference rankings that
were inconsistent with the lexicographic orders. These subjects appeared
to make trade-offs.
It could be argued that these percentages are too high, since they do not
allow for error or unreliability in the data. Therefore, subjects whose rank-
ings were almost consistent with a lexicographic order were reclassified.
Whenever a subject's ranking was consistent with a lexicographic order
after the ranks for two societies were reversed, that subject was assigned
to the lexicographic group. With this revised count, 40% and 39% of the
subjects in Experiment 1 had fairness and preference rankings that were
inconsistent with lexicographic orders. In Experiment 2, 29% and 60% had
fairness and preference rankings that were inconsistent with lexicographic
orders. Thus, an average of 42% of the subjects in each condition appeared
to make trade-offs.
Which factors accounted for the most variance?
Individual fairness and preference rankings were correlated with three or-
thogonal rankings, each based on the experimental measures (i.e., low and
high mean salary, low and high minimum salary, or wide and narrow sal-
ary standard deviation). Table 3 shows the percentage of individuals whose
rankings correlated highest with each experimental measure. In the fair-
ness condition, the largest percentage of subjects had rankings that corre-
lated highest with salary standard deviation. In the preference condition,
the largest percentage of subjects had rankings that correlated highest with
minimum salary. However, the most striking result in Table 3 is that there
are no clear winners. Subjects used a variety of different strategies in their
judgments.
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Table 4 Median correlations of subject























Minimum 0.82 0.22 0.38 0.77 0.11 0.36
salary
Salary 0.28 0.77 0.44 0.22 0.72 0.33
std. dev.
Mean 0.35 0.28 0.66 0.44 0.44 0.78
salary
Table 4 provides information about the average correlations of subjects
in each of the three groups and additional information about the extent to
which their rankings correlate with other measures. Rows are the three
experimental measures, and columns are the three groups of subjects whose
fairness and preference rankings correlated highest with each experimental
measure. Entries are median correlations. Correlations should be high down
the diagonals, since subjects in those groups had rankings that were best-
fit by that measure. Those correlations ranged from .66 to .82 for fairness
and .72 to .78 for preference.3
Correlations on the off-diagonals show average predictability of the
measures. These correlations are lower than those on the diagonals, rang-
ing from .22 to .44 for fairness and .11 to .44 for preference. Although they
are considerably smaller, these off-diagonal correlations differ significantly
from zero. In sum, other factors also contribute to the predictability of the
rankings.
How do societal rankings differ across the three groups? Figure 3 pre-
sents median fairness rankings for subjects in each best-fitting group.
Numbers range from 1 (least fair society) to 8 (most fair society). In each
box, rows are salary means, and columns are salary standard deviations.
A box represents a set of societies with the same minimum salary; different
boxes show societies with different minimum salaries.
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Upper boxes, center boxes, and lower boxes present median rankings
for the mean salary, the salary standard deviation, and the minimum sal-
ary group, respectively. Rankings differ considerably across groups. Sub-
jects whose rankings were best fit by mean salary assigned lower ranks to
low-mean societies and higher ranks to high-mean societies. Subjects whose
rankings were best fit by salary standard deviation assigned lower ranks to
wide-standard-deviation societies and higher ranks to narrow-standard-
deviation societies. Finally, subjects whose rankings were best fit by mini-
mum salary tended to assign lower ranks to low-minimum-salary societies
and higher ranks to high-minimum-salary societies.
Despite these differences, certain patterns are common across all three
groups. Within a box, the low-mean, wide-standard-deviation society is
always ranked lowest. Furthermore, the high-mean, narrow-standard-
deviation society is always ranked highest. Of interest are the rankings in
the other two cells. Subjects whose rankings were best predicted by salary
mean (upper boxes) judged the high-mean, wide-standard-deviation soci-
ety as more fair than the low-mean, narrow-standard-deviation society for
both levels of minimum salary. Subjects whose rankings were best pre-
dicted by salary standard deviation (center boxes) judged the low-mean,
narrow-standard-deviation society as more fair than the high-mean, wide-
standard-deviation society. Subjects whose rankings were best described
by minimum salary (lower boxes) did not have a consistent set of rankings.
In sum, Figure 3 shows systematic differences in trade-offs across groups.
Similar patterns were found for preference rankings.
Effects of the work-salary correlation
Experiment 2 investigates societies that vary in work-salary correlations as
well as minimum salaries, salary means, and salary standard deviations.
Table 5 presents the percentage of subjects whose fairness and preference
rankings correlated highest with the four experimental factors. Approxi-
mately 75% of the subjects had fairness rankings that correlated highest
with the work-salary correlation. The remaining 25% had rankings that
were best described by minimum salary. Approximately 50% of the sub-
jects had preference rankings that were best described by the correlation
and the other 50% were best predicted by the minimum salary. Almost no
subjects had fairness or preference rankings that were best predicted from
measures of equality or efficiency.
Table 6 shows median correlations for best-fitting groups, as in Table 4.
Rankings of subjects in the correlation and minimum salary groups were
correlated with all four experimental measures. Once again, correlations
were highest for the best-fitting measures. The other correlations were lower,
but not zero. These correlations ranged from .16 to .52 for fairness and .12
to .44 for preference. Salary mean and standard deviation also contribute
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Figure 3 Median rankings of societies from Experiment 1 for each group of sub-
jects best fit by an experimental measure. Upper boxes, center boxes, and lower
boxes show mean salary, salary standard deviation, and minimum salary groups,
respectively. Numbers range from 1 (least fair society) to 8 (most fair society).
Table 5 Percentage of subjects best fit by experimental measures











to the predictability of fairness and preference rankings, although they are
not the best predictors.
Figure 4 presents median fairness rankings for subjects in the correlation
and minimum salary groups. Numbers range from 1 (least fair society) to
16 (most fair society). Within each box, rows are minimum salaries and
columns are work-salary correlations. Different boxes reflect societies with
different levels of salary mean and salary standard deviation. Once again,
certain patterns are consistent across groups. Within a box, the low-
correlation, low-minimum-salary society is always ranked lowest. The high-
correlation, high-minimum-salary society is always ranked highest. Sub-
jects in the correlation group (upper boxes) judged the high-correlation,
Trade-offs in fairness and preference judgments 147
Table 6 Median correlations of subject rankings with experimental measures


































Note: Mean salary and salary standard deviation groups are not presented because
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Minimum Salary Group (26%)
Std. Dev. = Wide Std. Dev. = Narrow
Mean = Low Mean = High Mean = Low Mean = High
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Figure 4 Median rankings of societies from Experiment 2 for subjects whose rank-
ings were best fit by the correlation (upper boxes) and the minimum salary (lower
boxes). Numbers range from 1 (least society) to 16 (most fair society).
low-minimum-salary society as more fair than the low-correlation, high-
minimum-salary society in all four boxes. Subjects in the minimum-salary
group (lower boxes) showed the opposite pattern. Preference rankings were
similar to fairness rankings.
Discussion
Results from these experiments suggest that many people make trade-offs
when judging societal fairness and preference. When equality and effi-
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ciency are varied in conjunction with other factors, trade-offs tend to occur
between minimum salary and work-salary correlation. These measures are
better predictors of fairness and preference judgments. Approximately 75%
and 50% of the subjects had fairness and preference rankings that were
best described by work-salary correlation, respectively. Virtually none of
the subjects had fairness or preference rankings that were best predicted
by equality and efficiency.
Why might people focus on the minimum salary and the work-salary
correlation? Minimum salary might be viewed as a safety net beneath which
people should not fall. The work-salary correlation may reflect the incen-
tive system within the society. A high correlation implies that greater effort
will lead to greater rewards. It also implies equal pay for equal work. But
is societal fairness simply a high effort-reward correlation? Correlations
could be high due to extreme outliers. Consider the salaries of some chief
executive officers that are several hundred times more than those of the
average workers. Effort-reward correlations could be low for most of the
workers, but the overall correlation could be high due to a single point, the
CEO. It would be interesting to investigate the extent to which societies
with identical correlations but different outliers are judged fair.
As far back as Aristotle, justice has been thought to depend on the re-
lationship between deservingness (effort, work, or productivity) and re-
ward. Mellers (1982) examined fairness ratings of faculty members in hy-
pothetical departments and found quite different deservingness functions
between salary and merit in departments with the same salary-merit cor-
relations. Deservingness functions were positively accelerated, linear, and
negatively accelerated, depending on the joint distribution of salary and
merit. Deservingness functions are not captured by correlations alone.
However, in many situations, correlations may be a good first approxima-
tion. In fact, the correlation is a special case of Birnbaum's (1983) adjust-
ment model of fair salaries. Birnbaum suggested that fair salaries might be
determined by a context-dependent relationship between deservingness
and reward. Salaries are assumed to be fair to the extent that they are
determined by this relationship.
Results from these experiments also suggest that the societies in which
people prefer to live are not necessarily judged as most fair. Many people
judge societies with high correlations as fair, but they prefer to live in so-
cieties with high minimum salaries. Differences between fairness and pref-
erence judgments have also been found by Messick and Sentis (1979), who
investigated judged allocations in situations where subjects assigned pay-
ments to themselves and another. In one condition, subjects divided re-
wards fairly, and in the other condition, they allocated rewards as they
wished. Amounts that subjects preferred to give themselves were larger than
amounts they judged to be fair.
What motivates societal preferences? One possibility is self-interest. People
may be concerned about their own position in society. When their status








































0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
WORK INDEX
4.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
WORK INDEX
4.0
Figure 5 Two illustrative societies from Experiment 3. Common members (solid
circles) are nested within different societies. Additional members (open circles) are
varied across societies.
is uncertain, it may be prudent to prefer societies that help the least advan-
taged. Rawls develops this point in his theory of distributive justice. An-
other possibility is altruism. People may be genuinely concerned about the
plight of the poor and prefer to live in societies that care for the needy.
Research on social dilemmas indicates that some percentage of people act
in altruistic ways, even when it entails personal sacrifice (Caporael, Dawes,
Orbell, & van de Kragt, 1989). See Tyler and Dawes (this book) for a further
discussion of this topic.
Micro fairness
Experiment 3 examines whether factors that describe fairness judgments at
the individual level resemble those at the societal level. Societies in Exper-
iment 1 were constructed such that eight individuals (points in the scatter-
plots) were common to each society. Other points were added to manipu-
late the minimum salary, salary mean, and salary standard deviation. Figure
5 shows two illustrative societies. Solid points are the common members;
open points are individuals who differ across societies. Society A has a
high salary mean and a high minimum salary, but a wide salary standard
deviation. Society B has a narrow salary standard deviation, but a low sal-
ary mean and low minimum salary.
Subjects were asked to rate the extent to which an individual was un-
derbenefited or overbenefited on an 80 to -80 scale (where 80 = very very
overbenefited, 0 = fairly treated, and —80 = very very underbenefited). As
in the other experiments, they were told that the poverty level was $15,000.
Subjects were given eight societies and judged 15 randomly ordered indi-
viduals in each society (the eight solid points in each panel of Figure 5 and
seven points that differed for each society). After completing the experi-
mental trials, subjects answered the same questionnaire used in Experi-
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75
Figure 6 Mean overbenefited ratings for common members averaged over soci-
eties. Ratings are plotted against salary with a separate curve for each level of work.
ment 1. Participants were 88 undergraduates at the University of California
at Berkeley who received credit in a lower division psychology course for
their participation.
Figure 6 presents ratings for the eight common individuals, averaged
over all eight societies. Judged overbenefitedness increased with salary and
decreased with work index. Similar means were obtained for each society.
Average ratings for the common individuals never changed sign across
societies; an individual who appeared overbenefited in one society was
never judged as underbenefited in another. But despite the fact that the
signs did not change, the magnitudes of the ratings varied systematically
across societies.
To illustrate the contextual effects, Table 7 presents average ratings of
the common individuals in each of the eight societies. Common individu-
als were judged more overbenefited as mean salary, salary standard devia-
tion, and minimum salary decreased. All three factors were statistically
significant.4
Which factors accounted for more variance?
For each subject, eight ratings were computed, one for each society, by
averaging responses for the common individuals. These ratings were cor-
related with three orthogonal rankings based on salary mean, salary stan-
dard deviation, and minimum salary. Table 8 shows that for the largest
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Note: Mean ratings are averaged over common members. The response scale ranged
from -80 to 80.









percentage of subjects, overbenefitedness ratings correlated with salary
mean, followed by salary standard deviation, and then minimum salary.
Correlations were also computed for each common member in all eight
societies, and results were similar to those based on averages; for the larg-
est percentage of subjects, overbenefitedness correlated with decreases in
salary mean.
Discussion
Experiments 1 and 3 allow a comparison of societal and individual fairness
judgments. At the societal level, the largest percentage of subjects had fair-
ness rankings that correlated highest with salary standard deviation. Min-
imum salary came in second, and salary mean took third place. At the
individual level, the largest percentage of subjects had fairness rankings
that correlated highest with salary mean. Salary standard deviation came
in second place, followed by minimum salary.
Differences between individual and societal fairness might occur be-
cause people use different criteria to assess macro and micro justice. Sub-
jects may make different trade-offs between equality and efficiency at dif-
ferent levels. If so, trade-offs could come into conflict; it may be impossible
to make optimal trade-offs simultaneously.
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Individual differences
The present experiments demonstrate individual differences in fairness and
preference judgments. Several studies have examined individual differ-
ences in fairness. In a review on sex and gender differences, Kahn and
Gaeddert (1985) noted that men tend to endorse distributions of rewards
in which ratios of outcomes to inputs are equal across individuals, whereas
women tend to allocate rewards in a more uniform fashion. Major and
Adams (1983) reported that women tend to have less variability than men
in their reward allocations. Other studies have investigated individual dif-
ferences in political ideology. Rasinski (1987) found that perceptions of fair-
ness correlated with political orientation. Those scoring high on efficiency
(proportionality rules for fair divisions) tended to be more conservative,
whereas those scoring high on equality (egalitarian rules for fair divisions)
tended to be more liberal.
Subjects in the present experiments were UC Berkeley undergraduates,
and one might expect the vast majority to be liberal Democrats. However,
only 60% of the subjects described themselves as Democrats. The average
conservative/liberal rating was at the center of the scale. Roughly half were
men, and half were women. The average self-report of socioeconomic sta-
tus was 3.3 on a scale from 1 (lower class) to 5 (upper class).
Membership in a best-fitting group correlated significantly with the judged
importance of that measure. However, group membership did not corre-
late significantly with demographic variables and political opinions, with a
few notable exceptions. In Experiment 1, subjects with lower socioeco-
nomic status tended to have fairness rankings that were best predicted by
minimum salary. In Experiment 2, men tended to have preference rank-
ings that were best predicted from the effort-reward correlation. Demo-
crats, liberals, and women tended to have preference rankings that were
best predicted from the minimum salary.
Conclusions
Results from the present experiments suggest that some people make trade-
offs between economic measures of equality and efficiency when judging
societal fairness and preference. However, trade-offs tend to occur more
often between the minimum salary and the work-salary correlation. These
measures predict fairness and preference judgments to a greater extent
than equality and efficiency. Furthermore, trade-offs tend to differ for fair-
ness and preference judgments. The percentage of subjects best fit by min-
imum salary was greater for preference rankings than fairness rankings.
Interestingly, preference rankings seemed more in line with Rawls's theory
of justice than fairness rankings. Fairness rankings were not entirely con-
sistent with Rawls's theory, egalitarianism, or utilitarianism.
Finally, factors that determine fairness at the individual level differ from
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those that describe fairness at the societal level. Micro and macrojustice
can come into conflict whenever we think it is fair to treat individuals and
groups differently. It may be one thing to vote for overall cuts in welfare
programs, and another thing to refuse assistance to a homeless person
who lost his job due to illness. Understanding the nature of these differ-
ences may ultimately help us reach more acceptable trade-offs between
economic and psychological factors.
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Notes
1 Subjects were given pairs of societies and judged which society had: (1) a higher mean
salary, (2) a larger salary variance, and (3) a higher correlation between salary and effort.
All subjects properly detected differences in the manipulations.
2 Half of the subjects were presented with scatterplots showing the poverty line as a horizon-
tal line, and half were not. There was no significant effect of poverty line, and all analyses
were collapsed over the two groups.
3 These correlations are point-biserial correlations that cannot exceed .87.
4 All tests of significance were done at an alpha level of .01.
